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I.  Introduction 
Research  using  cross-sectional  survey  ‘snapshots’  of household  income  taken  over 
the  past  quarter  century  reveals  a growing  inequality  in  the  distribution  of  annual  money 
income  of  households  in  the  United  States  (Thurow,  1987;  Levy,  1987;  Levyand  Michel, 
1991;  Michel,  1991;  Karoly,  1990;  Center  on  Budget  and  Policy  Priorities,  1990; 
Easterlin,  MacDonald  and  Macunovich,  1990),  prompting  some  to  argue  that  the  U.S. 
middle  class  is  disappearing  (Phillips,  1990;  Bradbury,  1986).  Aggregate  data  from  the 
National  Accounts  and  from  wealth  surveys  (Wolff,  1989;  Eargle,  1991)  reinforce  this 
conclusion  by  showing  a  growing  share  of  income  from  capital,  a  falling  share  for 
earnings,  and  a slightly  increasing  concentration  of  wealth  among  upper-income  groups. 
Also  well-documented  is  greater  inequality  in  the  size  distribution  of  earnings  and  wages 
in  the  late  1980s  as  compared  to  one  or  two  decades  before  (Gottschalk  and  Danziger, 
1989;  Burtless,  1989;  Blackbum  et  al.,  this  volume). 
Despite  the  consistency  of  these  results,  their  almost  universal  reliance  on  data 
drawn  from  cross-sectional  snapshots  leaves  unanswered  many  important  questions 
regarding  the  nature  of  the  changes  taking  place  in  the  distribution  of  income  and  wealth. 
Most  importantly,  cross-sectional  snapshots  provide  information  only  on  net  changes  in 
economic  position  and  thus  reveal  little  about  the  extent  and  nature  of  movement  into  and 
out  of  the  middle  class.  For  example,  net  increases  in  the  number  of  low-  relative  to 
middle-income  households  occur  when  unfavorable  transitions  --  families  falling  from -.  l 
2 
middle-  to  low-income  status  -- outnumber  favorable  transitions  involving  movement  into 
the  ranks  of the  middle-class  by previously  low-income  households.  Surely  it is important 
to  track  these  two  flows  separately.  Are  increasing  numbers  of  families  ‘falling  from 
grace’,  as  Katherine  Newman  (1988)  puts  it?  If  so,  who  are  they  and  what  events  are 
linked  to  their  income  losses?  Or  is  mobility  into  the  middle  class  declining?  And,  if 
so,  does  this  affect  in  particular  young  families?  What  avenues  for  upward  mobility  are 
disappearing?  These  are  the  types  of  questions  we  seek  to  address  for  adults  crossing 
either  the  lower  or  the  upper  boundary  of  the  middle  class. 
A  second  set  of  issues  we  address  involves  linkages  between  changes  in  income 
and  changes  in  wealth.  A  recent  Census  Bureau  study  (Eargle,  1991)  comparing 
population  snapshots  in  1984  and  1988  found  that  the  median  net  worth  of  the  most 
affluent  quintile  of households  ranked  by  net  worth  increased  by  14 percent,  while  overall 
median  net  worth  declined  slightly.  However,  this  kind  of  study  cannot  tell  us  whether 
the  increase  was  due  to  gains  made  by  those  moving  into  this  quintile  or  gains  made  by 
those  already  among  the  richest  fifth.  Nor  can  it  tell  us  whether  changes  in  household 
income  are  reinforced  by  changes  in  wealth.  Although  one  would  expect  such  linkages, 
it  still  may  be  that  many  households  apparently  falling  out  of  the  ranks  of  the  affluent 
into  the  middle  class  at  the  same  time  enjoyed  substantial  inceases  in,  say,  housing  or 
stock-market  wealth. 
We  address  these  issues  by  analyzing  trends  in  the  transitions  of prime  age  (25-54 
years  old)  adults  into  and  out  of  the  middle  class  using  22  years  of  data  from  the  Panel 
Study  of  Income  Dynamics.  We  begin  by  reviewing  the  methodology  and  measurement 3 
procedures  that  we  employ  to  define  the  middle  class  and  transitions  into  and  out  of 
middle-class  status.  Next  we  present  our  basic  findings  which,  in  fact,  show  a persistent 
‘withering’  of  the  middle  class  since  about  1980.  We  then  search  for  clues  as  to  who 
moved  into  and  out  of  the  middle-income  groups  and  the  source  of  such  changes. 
Because  notions  of  ‘class’  are usually  based  on  measures  of  wealth  as well  as income,  we 
also  investigate  longitudinal  changes  in the  wealth  distribution  in the  1980s  for  these  same 
individuals.  Our  findings  on  wealth  reinforce  those  based  on  income.  .Tho  paper 
concludes  with  a brief  discussion  of  the  policy  implications  of  our  fmdings. 
II.  Methodological  Approach 
Since  we  needed  longitudinal  data  on  income  transitions  in  different  periods  of 
the  recent  past,  we  used  the  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics,  a panel  survey  of  U.S. 
households  begun  in  1968  by  the  Survey  Research  Center  (Hill,  1991).  By  following  all 
members  of  its  original  sample  households,  the  PSID  provides  (except  for  immigration 
and  differential  nonresponse)  continuous  representation  of  the  U.S.  population  through 
time. 
Low-income  families  were  initially  oversampled,  but weights  have  been  developed 
to  adjust  both  for  the  differential  initial  sampling  probabilities  and  for  the  differential 
nonresponse  that  has  occurred  since  the  beginning  of  the  study  (Survey  Research  Center, 
1984).  Assuming  that  differential  nonresponse  bias  is eliminated  through  weighting,  the 
adults  in  our  PSID  sample  provide  continuous  representation  of  adults  in  the  US. 
population  with  the  sole  exception  of  immigrants  to  the  United  States  since  1968. 4 
Our  interest  in  middle-class  transitions  led  us  to  focus  on  the  prime-age 
population  --  men  and  women  age  25-50  in  the  first  year  of  the  five-year  period  over 
which  income  transitions  are  observed  (see  below).  The  public  discussion  of  the 
economic  fate  of  the  middle  class  generally  concerns  ‘prune-age’  adult  Americans  -- 
individuals  too  young  to  have  reached  the  conventional  age  of  early  retirement  (55)  but 
old  enough  to  be living  independently  from  their  parents  (25),  thus,  excising  many  of  the 
life  cycle  movements  up  and  down  the  distribution  which  are  related  to  age--e.g.,  leaving 
school  or  retirement. 
Sociologists  argue  that  the  concept  of middle  class  (and  ‘class’  in  general)  is based 
on  far  more  than  just  income  (Jencks,  1991).  While  this  is  true,  the  many  unanswered 
questions  regarding  household  income  justify  focusing  on  this  dimension.  To  avoid 
confusion,  we  hereafter  refer  to  our  divisions  of  economic  well-being  as  low-,  middle- 
and  high-income. 
We  gather  information  from  annual  interviews  conducted  from  1968  to  1989, 
which  cover  income  received  in  calendar  years  1967  through  1988,  as  well  as  wealth 
reported  in  the  1984  and  1989  interviewing  waves.  Income  transitions  are  defined  over 
all possible  periods  of  five  consecutive  years  observed  in  the  data.’  Each  sample  adult’s 
‘initial’  household  economic  position  is  defined 
income  (with  and  without  adjustments  for  family 
five-year  interval.  A  ‘final  position  is  defined  by 
by  the  two-year  average  household 
size)  over  the  first  two  years  of  the 
household  income  averaged  over  the 
fourth  and  fiih  years  of  the  interval.  Two-year  averages  are  used  in  order  to  provide  a 
more  reliable  picture  of  change  in  economic  status.2  A  transition  occurs  if  average 5 
income  in  the  fourth  and  fifth  years  was  different  enough  from  average  income  in the  first 
two  years  to  cross  over  one  of  the  two  thresholds  that  bound  our  middle-income  category. 
Aside  from  using  two-year  accounting  periods,  we  departed  from  the  conventional 
measurement  of  household  income  in  two  ways.  First,  since  food-stamp  income  is 
arguably  equivalent  to  cash  income,  we  included  the  dollar  value  of  food  stamps  as  a 
component  of  household  income.  Second,  since  taxes  reduce  a  household’s  disposable 
income,  we  subtracted  estimates  of  federal  income  taxes  and  Social  Security  payroll  taxes 
from  each  household’s  income. 
Our  search  for  upper  and  lower  boundaries  of  ‘middle  income’  began  with  a 
review  of how  several  authors  have  defined  the  rich,  affluent,  well-to-do,  upper  class,  etc., 
in  recent  studies  and  the  issue  of  whether  to  adjust  income  for  needs  (e.g.,  family  size) 
or  not  (see  the  appendix).  Some  adjust  income  for  family  size,  others  use  income  alone; 
some  studies  use  after-tax  income,  most  use  Census  (pre-tax,  post-transfer)  money 
income;  some  studies  define  affluence  relative  to  a  percentile  point  in  the  distribution, 
others  have  an  absolute  dollar  figure  that  is  subsequently  adjusted  for  inflation  using 
either  the  CPI-U  or  the  revised  CPI-UXI. 
As  detailed  in  the  appendix,  we  developed  two  absolute  measures  of  economic 
status,  both  of  which  are based  on  after-tax  household  income,  and  set  the  lower  boundary 
of  middle  income  at  roughly  the  20th  percentile  of  the  sample  in  the  middle  of  our 
sample  period  and  the  upper  boundary  at the  90th  percentile.  The  first  measure  is post-tax 
household  income  @  adjusted  for  family  size.  The  lower  and  upper  boundaries  are 6 
$18  500  and  $55  000,  respectively,  in  1987  dollars,  and  are  applied  to  all  years  using  the 
CPi-UXl  price  index. 
Our  second  measure  of  economic  status  adjusts  income  for  family  size  by  dividing 
income  by  the  U.S.  poverty  thresholds  based  on  family  size.  The  resulting  ‘income-to- 
needs’  ratio  equals  1.0  for  a  household  with  income  just  equal  to  its  poverty  threshold 
(which,  in  1990,  equaled  roughly  $13  000  for  a family  of  four),  2.0  for  a family  with  an 
\ 
income  of  twice  its  poverty  threshold,  etc.  The  lower  and  upper  boundaries  of  middle 
income-to-needs  are  2.0  and  6.0,  respectiveIy.3  Because  the  basic  patterns  of  income 
transitions  appear  similar  for  both  measures,  we  concentrate  on 
unadjusted  income  but  note  differences  between  the  two  measures 
Wealth 
transitions  based  on 
when  they  occur. 
Because  notions  of  economic  position  and  class  depend  on  both  long-term  wealth 
and  income,  we  were  also  interested  in  questions  surrounding  the  movement  of  income 
and  wealth  in  relation  to  each  other.  Do  adults  who  move  between  income  groups 
experience  like  changes  in  wealth?  Do  families  falling  from  middle-income  status 
experience  declines  in  net  worth  and/or  increases  in  debt,  or  are  the  wealth  changes 
countervailing  ?  While  PSID  wealth  information  is  not  available  in  most  years,  we  were 
able  to  compare  income  transitions  between  1984-85  and  1987-88  with  PSID  measures 
of  net  worth  (total  nonpension  assets  minus  debt)  taken  in  1984  and  repeated  in  1989. 
Tax  adjustments  are  not  yet  possible  for  all  years  of  the  income  data,  so  we  base  income 
transitions  on  Census  pre-tax,  post-transfer  money  income. 7 
III.  Snapshot  Comparisons 
We  began  by  calibrating  PSID  data  against  the  Census  Bureau’s  Current 
Population  Survey  (CPS),  the  major  data  source  of  previous  studies.  To  do  this,  we 
treated  the  PSID  as  if  it  were  a  series  of  cross-sections  and  compared  pre-tax  income 
from  1967-1986  of  aI.l PSID  households  against  published  CPS  data  on  the  distribution 
of  households  with  pre-tax  incomes  near  our  low-  and  high-income  boundaries  -- $15  000 
and  $50  000  in  1989  dollars.  (The  CPS  does  not  regularly  record  income  or  payroll  taxes 
and  has  collected  Food  Stamp  infonnation  regularly  only  after  1979.)  The  two  data 
sources  show  very  similar  trends  in  the  middle-income  group  -- both  time  series  show  a 
slow  but  steady  decline  in  the  fraction  of  middle-income  households  from  nearly  60 
percent  in  the  late  1960s  to  about  51  percent  in  the  ‘late  1980s  (Figure  1).  The  simple 
correlation  coefficient  (r)  between  the  PSID  and  CPS  time  series  on  middle-income 
households  is  quite  high  --  .96. 
Figure  1  here 
Because  the  CPS  consistently  records  less  household  income  from  its respondents 
than  does  the  PSID,  the  CPS  sample  tends  to produce  higher  estimates  of  households  with 
b incomes  below  $15  000  and  lower  proportions  of  households  with  incomes  above 
$50  000.  But  here  again  the  trends  --  an  uneven  rise  in  the  proportion  of  high-income 
households,  an  unstable  but  essentially  trendless  time  series  on  the  proportion  of  house- 
holds  with  low  incomes,  resulting  in  a declining  middle-income  group  --  are  quite  similar 













FIGURE  1: Distribution  of  Low,  Middle  and  High  Income 
Households  in  the  Current  Population  Survey  (19674989) 
and  in  the  Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics  (19674986) 
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Source  for  CPS  Data:  U.S  Bureau  of  the  Census 
Current  Population  Reports,  Series  P-60,  No. 168 
Money  Income  and  Poverty  Status  1989.  Table  2 8 
lower  boundary  and  .95  for  the  upper  boundary  of  middle  income.  Macroeconomic 
conditions  account  for  much  of  the  irregularity  in the  trends,  with  recessions  around  1970, 
in  the  mid-1970s  and  again  in  the  early  1980s  temporarily  increasing  the  proportion  of 
low-income  households  and  reducing  that  of  high-income  households.  On  balance,  it 
appears  that  the  PSID  and  CPS  data  telI  very  similar  cross-sectional  stories.4 
Are  there  fewer  middle-income  households? 
, 
We  next  examined  cross-sectional  trends  in  the  the  size  of  PSID  income  groups, 
using  the  sample  of  2%  to  50-year-olds  and  our  various  adjustments  to  income.  Figures 
2  and  3  summarize  the  results. 
Figures  2  and  3  here 
As  with  CPS  trends,  there  appears  to be  an irregular  but  clearly  discernible  decline 
in  the  proportion  of  prime-aged  adults  with  household  incomes  in  the  middle  (the  solid 
line  in  Figure  2).  Thus,  our  various  adjustments  to  income  and  restriction  of  the  sample 
to  prime-age  adults  changes  the  basic  CPS  household-income  story  very  little.  However, 
unlike  CPS  trends,  PSID  proportions  of  adults  with  size-adiusted  incomes  in  the  middle 
follow  a rather  different  pattern  (the  correlation  between  the  PSID  time  series  with  and 
without  family-size  adjustments  is only  .69),  with  the  proportion  in  the  middle  income-to- 
needs  category  increasing  markedly  during  most  of  the  1970s  and  only  then  declining 
sharply. 
Underlying  the  different  trends  is  a sharp  decline  in  family  size  in  the  late  1960s 
and  early  197Os,  coupled  with  nearly  flat  real  income  change,  which  reduced  the  number 
of  low  income-to-needs  adults  (Figure  3) and  increased  the  ranks  of middle-income  adults FIGURE  2: Proportion  of  Adults  Livin  in  Households 
with  “Middle”  Income  and  Income P Needs  in  the 
Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics,  19674986 
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Note:  Income  data  are  post-tax  2  year  averages. FIGURE 3:  Proportion  of  Adults  Living  in  Households  with 
“Low”  and  “High”  Income  and  Income/Needs  in  the 
Panel  Study  of  Income  Dynamics,  1967-1986 
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Note:  Income  data  are  post-tax  2  year  averages. l 
(Figure  2) between  1967  and  1973.  However,  in  the  late  1970s  and  throughout  the  1980s 
income  changes  became  nearly  as  important  as  changes  in  family  size,  making  more 
nearly  parallel  the  trends  for  the  two  income  measures. 
9 
The  middle-income  group  shrank  from  a  peak  of  about  75  percent  of  the 
population  in  the  early  1970s  and  again  in  1977-78  to  a  trough  of  65  percent  around 
1983.  Our  most  recent  figures,  for  198586  show  just  slightly  more  than  ttio-thirds  of 
the  population  --  67  percent  --  in  the  middle-income  category.  If  anything,  the  recent 
decline  in  the  size  of  the  middle  income-to-needs  group  is  slightly  steeper;  only  about  65 
percent  of  the  prime-age  adult  population  can  be termed  ‘middle-income’  by  this  measure 
of  well-being,  down  from  a peak  of  75  percent  less  than  one  decade  before. 
Whereas  a  family-size-driven  decline  in  the  low  income-to-needs  population 
accounted  for  most  of  the  rise  in  the  middle-income  share  during  the  early  197Os,  the 
declining  middle-income  share  in  the  late  1970s  and,  especially,  during  the  1980s  resulted 
primarily  from  growth  in the  high-income  and  high  income-to-needs  population.  Between 
1979-80  and  1985-86,  the  proportion  of  high-income  families  grew  by  more  than  50 
percent  --  from  about  8 to  over  13 points.  High  income-to-needs  grew  by  even  more  -- 
from  10  percent  in  1979-80  to  over  16  percent  in  1986.  To  paraphrase  Michel  (1991, 
p.  201),  the  rising  tide  of economic  growth  in  the  1980s  appears  to have  lifted  the  yachts, 
but  neither  the  tugboats  nor  the  rowboats. 10 
IV.  Transitions 
It  appears  that  the  fraction  of  adults  with  middle  income,  middle  income-to-needs, 
and  perhaps  a  middle  class  standard  of  living  has  withered.  This  is  more  pronounced 
when  income  is  adjusted  for  family  size  and  is occasioned  by  a substantial  increase  in the 
number  of  adults  living  in  high-income  households  and  unsteady  growth  in  the  number 
of  low-income  adults.  Many  questions  remain  unanswered  about  even  the  basic  trends. 
What  kinds  of  people  are  actually  crossing  the  middle-income  boundaries?  What  events 
are  linked  to  their  income  losses  or  gains ?  How  do  periods  of  economic  growth  or 
recession  affect  flows  across  the  income  boundaries?  To  address  these  questions,  we 
investigate  actual  transitions  across  our  income  boundaries  using  longitudinal  data  on  our 
sample  of  adults. 
The  composition  of  a  population’s  share  of  low-,  middle-  and  high-income 
households  is  the  product  of  offsetting  flows  across  the  middle-income  boundaries.  For 
example,  growth  in  the  number  of  high-  at  the  expense  of  middle-income  adults  could 
result  from  increasing  numbers  of  people  making  the  transition  from  middle-  to  high- 
income  status,  decreasing  numbers  falling  from  high-  to  middle-income  status,  or  to 
varying  degrees  both  types  of  charges. 
The  first  column  of Table  1 shows  the  prevalence  of  transitions  involving  the  three 
income  groups.  When  averaged  across  all  of  the  five-year  observation  windows  afforded 
by  the  PSID’s  sample  period,  some  6.7 percent  of adults  whose  two-year  average  post-tax 
household  income  was  between  $18  500  and  $55  000  are  found  to  have  succeeded  in 11 
garnering  two-year  average  income  above  $55  000  two  years  later.  A much  larger  fraction 
--  29.7  percent  -- of  high-income  individuals  typically  fell  into  the  middle-income  group. 
(The  much  smaller  relative  size  of  the  high-income  group  translates  these  very  unequal 
conditional  transition  probabilities  into  more  nearly  equal,  overall  numbers  of  people 
making  the  offsetting  flows  across  the  upper  boundary  line.) 
Consistent  with 
Table  1 here  , 
abundant  research  on  flows  across  the  poverty  line  (Bane  and 
Ellwood,  1986;  Duncan  et  al.,  1984),  the  third  row  of  Table  1 shows  that  more  than  one 
third  of  low-income  adults  typically  succeeded  in  making  the  transition  over  the  $18  500 
middle-income  boundary,  while  7.0  percent  of  middle-income  adults  typically  fell  below 
it.’ 
The  importance  of  both  calendar  year  and  macroeconomic  conditions  is  evident 
in  Table  1. The  second  and  third  columns  divide  the  transitions  by  whether  the  middle 
of  the  five-year  observation  window  was  before  1980,  while  the  fourth  and  ftith  columns 
divide  the  sample  according  to whether  macroeconomic  conditions  (as  measured  by  five- 
year  trends  in  the  U.S.  Department  of  Commerce’s  series  on  per  capita  personal 
disposible  income)  were  favorable  or  not.6 
Relative  to  the  late  1960s  and  197Os, the  1980s  were  clearly  a period  in  which  &l 
four  of  the  transition  probabilities  tended  to  accelerate  reductions  in  the  size  of  the 
middle-income  group.  A higher  percentage  of individuals  climbed  into  high-income  status 
while  a smaller  percent  fell  out;  a lower  fraction  of  low-income  individuals  climbed  into Table  1.  Percent  of Adults Making Key  Income  Transitions 
Period  Effects  Cyclical  Effects 
All Years  Before  1980  1980 aud After  Nonrecession  Years  Recession  Years* 
High-home  Transitions 
Percent  of Middle-Income  Individuals 
Climbing  Out 
Percent  of High-Income  hlividuak 
FaUiug Out 
6.7  6.3  7.5  6.9  6.2 
29.7  31.1  27.1  28.5  31.8 
Low-Income  Transitions 
Percent  of Low-Income  Individuals 
Climbing  Out 
Percent  of Middle-Income  Individuals 
Fall&  Out 
33.6  35.5  30.4  35.0  32.3 
7.0  6.2  8.5  6.2  8.5 
*Recession  years  are defined  by  5-year  growth  in Per  Capita Real  Disposable  Personal  Income.  They  include  1974,  1975, 1979,  1980, 
and  1981. 12 
the  middle  class  while  a larger  fraction  of  middle-income  adults  fell  into  the  low-income 
group.’ 
Cyclical  factors  performed  as  expected  with  favorable  transitions  less  prevalent 
and  unfavorable  transitions  more  frequent  in recession  years.  Cyclical  and  period  effects 
had  very  similar  impacts  on  unfavorable  transitions;  period  effects  found  in  the  1980s 
were  somewhat  more  important  than  business-cycle  effects  for  favorable  transitions.  \ 
V.  Explaining  Transitions 
The  next  step  in  our  investigation  of  transitions  into  and  out  of  middle-income 
status  was  to  see  what  demographic  characteristics  correlated  most  strongly  with  the 
transitions  and  whether  characteristics  such  as  advanced  schooling  and  older  age  that  are 
known  to  have  been  more  favored  in  the  labor  market  in  the  1980s  were  also  powerful 
in  explaining  household-income-based  transitions.  We  do  this  both  with  and  without 
adjustments  for  the  effects  of  business-cycle  and  other  demographic  factors.  We  also 
present  data  on  what  components  of  income  -- earnings  of  adult  males,  females,  or  other 
family  members  --  figured  most  prominently  in  the  transitions. 
Who  moved? 
Table  2 helps  to  set  the  stage  by  showing  the  distribution  of  transitions  according 
to  the  marital  status  of  the  adults  undergoing  the  transitions  and  the  calendar  year  in 
which  they  occurred.’  Our  five-year  observation  windows  complicate  the  classification 
of  marital  status  somewhat,  since  someone  may  have  been  married  for  only  a portion  of .  13 
the  five-year  period.  We  concentrate  on just  three  groups  of  adults:  husbands  and  wives 
living  together  throughout  the  five-year  period;  all  other  men;  and  all  other  women. 
Table  2  about  here 
Married  couples  dominate  high-income  transitions,  particularly  prior  to  the  198Os, 
when  they  accounted  for  90  percent  of  all  transitions  into  high-income  status  and  79 
percent  of  transitions  from  high-  to  middle-income  status.  Married  couples  were  less 
likely  to  be  involved  in  movements  across  the  lower  boundary  of  the  middle-income 
category.  Other  men  -- mainly  single  men  living  without  children  __ and  other  women  -- 
both  single  women  and  women  heading  families  --  were  unlikely  to  experience  high- 
income  transitions,  but  more  likely  to  experience  low-income  transitions.  In  fact,  these 
‘other’  women  were  the  most  likely  group  in  the  1980s  to  move  from  low-  to  middle- 
income  status. 
The  dominance  of  married  couples  among  high-income  transitions  and  the 
importance  of  unmarried  women  among  low-income  transitions  is  in  large  part  a 
reflection  of  the  fact  that  these  groups  are  most  at  risk  of  making  those  transitions. 
Whether  actual  rates  of  transition  differ  for  these  and  other  demographic  groups  is  the 
next  question  we  address. 
Demographic  correlates 
A  look  at  differential  transition  rates  by  schooling,  race,  household  composition 
and  age  produced  few  surprises.  Favorable  transitions  -- both  for  middle-  to  high-income 
and  from  low-  to  middle-income  status  -- were  more  frequent  among  adults  with  college 
educations  and  less  frequent  among  female-headed  families  and,  especially,  among  bIacks. Table  2.  The  Demographics  of Moving  Into  and Out of Middle-Income  Status:  Percent  of Each Type  of Adult  Making  Transitions’ 
Transitions  into  High-Income  Statusb  Transitions  Out of Low-Income  Status’ 
All  Before  1980  1980 and After  All  Before  1980  1980 and After 
Married  Individualsd  86  90  74  56  65  37 
Other Men  8  5  13  14  12  20 
Other  Women  6  5  13  30  23  43 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100 
(Unweighted  number  of transition)  (766)  (514)  (252)  (1704)  (1261)  (443) 
Married  Individualsd 
Other Men 
Other  Women 
Transitions  out  of High-Income  Status’ 
77  79  74 
10  11  9 
13  10  17 
Transitions  into  Low-Income  Status’ 
49  50  48 
16  13  17 
35  37  31 
Unweighted  Number  of Transitions  (289)  (193)  (%)  (1240)  (828)  (412) 
Tram&ions  and events  are defined  over  five-  ear periods.  The  data covered  16 five-year  periods,  1967-71  through  1982-86.  The 
adult must be in the age range  25-50 in the fzs t year  of the  given period.  Eve  of those periods,  starting  with that  for  1978-82  are 
delined  as ‘1980 and after’  period,  while the other  eleven  are defined  as ‘Before  1980’. 
Q-ansitions  into  (out of) hi  -income  status are defined  as occurrin 
(more)  than $55,000  (in  19  !?  7 dollars,  using the CPI-UXl)  in both  tke 
when  the person’s  post-tax  and -transfer  family  income  is less 
or equal  to $55,000  in both  the fourth  and tifth  years. 
first  and second  years  of the five-year  period  and greater  than 
“Transitions out of (into)  low-income  status am defined  as occurring  when  the person’s  post-tax  and -transfer  family  income  is less 
than or equal  to (greater  than)  $18,500 (in  1987 dollars)  in both  the first  and second  years  of the five-year  period  and greater  than 
$18,500  in both the  fourth  and  fifth years. 
%e  percent  of transitions  occurring  to married  couples  is the sum of transitions  experienced  by husbands  in the 25-50  age range  and 
wives  in the 25-50  a 
husband  was require d 
e range.  The  within-group  distribution  of events  shown  in the table is that for  married  couples  where  the 
to be age 25-50.  Results  for couples  where  the wife  was required  to be age 25-50  were  very  similar. 
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The  incidence  of  unfavorable  transitions  was  a  mirror  image:  less  frequent  among  the 
college-educated  and  more  frequent  among  female-headed  families  and blacks.  Transitions 
into  high-income  status  were  somewhat  more  prevalent  among  older  adults  while 
transitions  from  low-  to middle-income  status  were  more  prevalent  among  younger  adults. 
Aside  from  the  drift  toward  middle-income-reducing  transitions  in  the  198Os,  these 
demographic  patterns  were  quite  similar  both  before  and  after  1980. 
We  performed  a series  of  logistic  regressions  using  each  of  our  four  transitions  as 
a dependent  variable  in  order  to  isolate  the  net  contribution  of  business-cycle,  period  and 
demographic  factors.  Independent  variables  included  schooling,  race,  household  composi- 
tion  and  age,  macroeconomic  conditions  as  measured  by  trend  in  per  capita  disposible 
personal  income  and  a set  of  dummy  variables  measuring  each  person’s  distance  between 
his  or  her  own  initial  household  income  and  the  middle-income  transition  boundary  line? 
The  four  basic  sets  of  regressions  are  presented  in  Appendix  Tables  A2-A5. 
We  first  combined  all sample  years  and  addressed  the  issue  of  whether  the  middle- 
income-withering  differences  in  transition  rates  after  versus  before  1980  could  be 
explained  by  differences  in  demographic  characteristics,  macroeconomic  conditions  or 
distance  to  the  transition  boundaries.”  The  answer  (compare  columns  (1)  and  (6)  in 
Tables  AZA5)  was  clearly  negative,  with  the  differences  in  all  four  regression-adjusted 
transition  rates  before  and  after  1980  generally  as  large  as  the  simple  differences 
displayed  in  Table  1. 
We  next  ran  regressions 
gauge  the  changing  importance 
separately  for  the  two  periods  before  and  after  1980  to 
of  demographic  factors.  As  before,  we  controlled  for 15 
macroeconomic  conditions  as  well  as  the  gap  between  each  person’s  household  income 
and  the  income  associated  with  the  transition  line.  Results  for  the  most  interesting 
demographic  variables  are  summarized  in  Figures  4  and  5.” 
Figures  4 and  5 here 
For  making  the  transition  into  high-income  status,  a  college  education  was  a 
significant  help,  while  being  young  (head  of  household  under  age  35)  or  black  hurt 
(Figure  4).  Blacks  were  only  half  as  likely  as  the  sample  average  to  move  ‘into  high- 
income  status  in  both  periods,  even  after  adjusting  for  differences  in  schooling,  family 
composition  and  the  fact  that  the  starting  point  for  the  typical  black  is further  away  from 
the  high-income  boundary.  Interestingly,  the  regression-adjusted  probability  of  female 
heads  moving  into  the  high-income  group  was  significantly  higher  in  the  1980s  than 
before.  Qhe  unadjusted  transition  probabilities  remained  at  a  low  2  percent  in  both 
periods.)  A  closer  look  at transitions  involving  these  women  after  1980  showed  that  most 
were  highly  educated,  young  and  childless.  Their  transitions  were  generally  due  to  the 
much  higher  real  earnings  growth  that  such  women  experienced  in the  1980s  (U.S.  Bureau 
of  the  Census,  1990). 
As  already  mentioned,  transitions  out  of low-income  status  (shown  in the  right  half 
of  Figure  4)  were  less  likely  in  the  1980s  for  all  groups.  Only  the  college-educated  had 
higher-than-average  probabilities  of  moving  out  of  low-income  status.  Being  young  lost 
its  advantage  in  the  198Os, while  blacks  and  female  heads  continued  to  be  less  likely  to 
move  into  the  middle  class. FIGURE  4 
Adjusted  Fractions  of  Various  Groups  Making  Favorable  Income  Transitions 
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FIGURE  5 
Adjusted  Fractions  of  Various  Groups  Making  Unfavorable  Income  Transitions 
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Downward  mobility  from  high-  to  middle-income  became  less  frequent  in  the 
1980s  than  before.  While  all  subgroups  within  the  high-income  class  shared  in  this 
favorable  development,  younger  families  continued  to  have  a higher-than-average  risk  of 
falling  into  the  middle  (Figure  5). 
The  probability  of  falling  from  middle-income  status  --  falling  from  grace  -- 
increased  sigticantly  in  the  1980s.  Female  heads  and  blacks  maintained  their  already 
higher-than-average  probability  of  falling  from  the  middle,  while  people  with  schooling 
beyond  high  school  had  lower-than-average  risks. 
Whose  income  changed  the  most? 
As  with  poverty  transitions  (Bane  and  Ellwood,  1986),  it  is  also  useful  to  isolate 
in  our  set  of  income  transitions  the  income  component  that  changed  the  most.  We  did  this 
by  calculating  for  each  of  our  transitions  the  dollar  changes  in  the  earnings  of  adult  men 
and  women  and  in the  income  of  other  family  members  (principally  older  children).  The 
component  changing  the  most  was  designated  ‘most  important’,  provided  it accounted  for 
at  least  half  of  the  net  change  in  total  income.  If  the  most  important  income  component 
failed  to  account  for  half  of  the  net  change,  then  the  given  transition  was  assigned  to  an 
‘other  income’  category. 
The  results,  shown  in  Table  3,  clearly  point  to  the  importance  of  men’s  earnings; 
it was  the  most  important  income  component  in  all four  of  the  transitions,  both  before  and 
after  1980.  Women’s  earnings  figured 
during  the  198Os,  while  the  importance 
declined  for  all  four  of  the  transitions. 
more  prominently  in  high-income  transitions 
of  the  income  of  other  adult  family  members 17 
Table  3  here 
The  lessening  importance  of other  earners  held  in particular  for transitions  between 
middle-  and  high-income  status.  Prior  to  the  198Os,  increases  in  other  family  members’ 
earnings  were  more  important  than  women’s  earnings  in  explaining  transitions  into  high- 
income  status;  after  1980  the  relative  importance  of  these  two  components  reversed. 
Decreases  in  other  family  members’eamings,  often  due  to  the  nest-leaving  departure  of 
a young  adult  from  the  family  home,  became  less  important  in  transitions  from  high-  to 
middle-income  status  in  the  1980s. 
A  more  detailed  look  at  the  favorable  transitions  involving  men’s  earnings  (data 
not  shown  in  Table  3)  showed  that  they  were  more  often  associated  with  higher  rates  of 
pay  rather  than  overtime 
earnings  was  more  evenly 
transitions  for  men  were 
hours  or  second  jobs.  Upward  mobility  linked  to  women’s 
split  between  increases  in  wage  rates  and  in hours.  Downward 
more  likely  to  result  from  changes  in  hours  --  job  Ioss  and 
unemployment  -- than  declining  rates  of  pay.  For  women,  decreases  in  both  wages  and 
hours  are  important  in  explaining  why  earned  income  declined. 
Jn general,  our  findings  support  those  of Blackburn  et al. (this  volume),  Blank  (this 
volume),  and  Danziger  and  GottschaLk  (this  volume).  The  widening  of  the  income 
distribution  and  the  withering  of  the  middle  class  are  mainly  associated  with  growing 
inequality  in  men’s  earnings  --  in  particular  wage  changes.  Women’s  earnings  are  of 
increasing  importance  in  explaining  movements  from  middle  to  high  income.  However, 
men’s  earnings  still  figures  most  prominently  in  at  least  twice  as  many  transitions  as  do 
women’s  earnings. Table  3.  Relative  Importance  of Men’s  and Women’s  Earnings  in Favorable  and Unfavorable  Income  Transitions 
Most Important  Income  Component’ 
Men’s Earnings 
Favorable  Traxi  tions 
(in percents) 
Into High-home  Out of Low-Income 
B;:z  “Ge?  Ble&z  “Se? 
51  50  50  53 
Unfavorable  Transitions 
(in percents) 
Out of High-Income  Into  Low-home 
Before 
1980  “Zte?  B;;:r  1  ‘%eYd 
50  57  60  63 
Women’s  Earnings  14  23  26  28  10  14  16  14 
Income  of Other Family  Members  26  15  11  6  30  22  15  13 
Other Income/Mixed  9  12  13  13  10  7  9  10 
Total  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100 
‘Income  of other  family  members  consists  of earnings  plus  any  asset income  of these  other  members. 
from  the family’s  total  money  income. 
‘Other Income  Mixed’  is the  residual  category _-  l 
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VI.  The  Role  of  Wealth 
Our  discussion  thus  far  has  focused  almost  entirely  on  income,  taking  wealth  into 
account  only  insofar  as  household  incomes  typically  include  very  small  amounts  of 
income  from  wealth  in  the  form  of  interest,  rent  and  dividends.  Our  belief  that 
accumulated  wealth  or,  more  precisely,  net  worth  constitutes  a major  difference  between 
the  lower,  middle  and  upper  classes  leads  us to  investigate  how  taking  wealth’&0  account 
changes  the  income-based  view  chosen  thus  far.  We  examine  recent  changes  in  the 
distribution  of  net  worth,  joint  distribution  of  income  and  net  worth,  and  distribution  of 
net  worth  among  people  making  the  kinds  of  income-based  transitions  analyzed  in  the 
first  part  of  the  chapter.  Our  measure  of  net  worth  includes  the  value  of  housing  equity, 
other  real  estate,  vehicles,  farms  and  businesses,  stocks,  savings  and  investments  and  other 
assets,  less  other  outstanding  debt.  Information  on  pension  wealth  was  not  available,  and 
even  if  it  were,  its  illiquidity  would  lead  us  to  treat  it  separately  in  our  analyses. 
The  PSID  contains  only  two  waves  with  comprehensive  wealth  data  --  1984  and 
1989.  Hence,  we  are  limited  to  changes  in  net  worth  between  the  mid-  and  late  1980s 
--  the  period  just  beyond  the  final  income  transition  year  (1986)  used  thus  far  in  this 
paper.  We  drew  a sample  of  25  to  50-year-olds  in  1984  for  this  analysis,  but  were  able 
only  to  use  data  on  pre-  rather  than  post-tax  household  income  for  our  income  measure. 
Income  transitions  are  measured  by  averaging  income  over  1984  and  1985  to  set  initial 
position  and  1987  and  1988  to  set  the  final  income  position. 
Changes  in  the  size  distribution  of  wealth  and  income 19 
We  begin  with  comparative  snapshots  showing  changes  in  the  size  distribution  of 
net  worth  between  1984  and  1989  (Table  4).  In  these  two  years  the  adults  in  our  sample 
were  ranked  by  net  worth  to determine  the  points  separating  the  20th,  5Oth,  80th  and  90th 
percentiles  of  the  wealth  distribution.”  Net  worth  at  the  90th  percentile  was  almost  40 
times  the  net  worth  of  the  20th  wealth  percentile  in  each  year.  In  contrast,  the  ratio  of 
the  90th  percentile  of  two-year  average  incomes  in  1984-85  to  the  20th  percentile  was 
\ 
only  3.6.  Thus,  as has  been  shown  with  numerous  sets  of  data,  net  worth  in  the  PSJD  in 
the  late  1980s  is  much  less  equally  distributed  than  income. 
Table  4  here 
The  relative  90th  to  20th  percentile  gap  in net  worth  in  1989  was  about  the  same 
as in  1984,  suggesting  that  the  1984-1989  period  was  marked  by roughly  equal  percentage 
gains  at  the  20th  and  90th  percentiles.  Similar  results  have  been  recorded  for  the  1983- 
1986  period  using  the  Federal  Reserve  Board’s  Survey  of Consumer  Finances  by  Avery 
and  Ken&hell  (1991).  Percentage  gains  in  the  middle  were  somewhat  smaller.  Of 
course,  the  dollar  changes  in  wealth  at  different  points  in  the  wealth  distribution  varied 
enormously,  with  the  top  decile  gaining  nearly  $114  000  between  1984  and  1989  and  the 
bottom  two  deciles  gaining  less  than  $3000. 
As  a  second  comparative  cross-sectional  tabulation,  we  ranked  our  prime-age 
adults  according  to  income  rather  than  wealth  and  calculated  average  income  and  wealth 
at  the  2Oth, 50th  and  90th  percentiles  of  income  (Table  5).13  Not  surprisingly,  this 
ranking  produces  less  extreme  inequality  in  the  distribution  of  wealth,  but  even  here Table  4.  Wealth  Inequality,  1984  and  1989 
Net  Worth’  Distribution 
20th  Percentile 
Median 
80th  Percentile 
90th  Percentile 
1984  Net  1989  Net 
worth  worth 
$  5281  $  8  162 
38  083  50  894 
117  478  175  537 
207  582  321  555 
Percent  Change  in  Change  in 
Net  Worth  Net  Worth 
55  $  2  881 
34  12  811 
49  58  059 
55  113  973 
Difference  9Oth-20th  202  301  313  393 
Ratio  9OthJ2Oth  39.3  39.4 
‘Net  Worth  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  the  value  of  housing  equity,  real  estate,  vehicles, 
farm/business,stocks,  savings/investment,  and  other  assets,  less  other  debt,  inflated  to  1987  dollars 
using  the  CPI-UXl. 20 
wealth  inequality  reinforced  income  inequality;  the  distribution  of  wealth  is  still 
significantly  less  equal  than  is  the  distribution  of  income. 
Table  5  here 
The  ratio  of  the  90th  to  the  20th  percentile  of  income  rose  from  3.6  to  3.8  over 
the  1984-85  to  1987-88  period,  while  the  wealth  ratios  for  these  same  people  rose  from 
10.10  to  10.73.  These  increases  imply  that  relative  change  at  the  upper  end  of  the 
distribution  (90th  percentile)  exceeded  change  at  the  lower  end  (20th  percentile)  in  both 
absolute  and  percentage  terms,  producing  a  widening  in  the  joint  distribution.  In  other 
words,  the  group  experiencing  the  largest  gains  in  income  is  also  enjoying  the  most 
substantial  gains  in  net  WOJ&I.‘~ 
Wealth  change  accompanying  income  transitions 
Our  final  analysis  combines  income  transitions  with  their  concomitant  wealth 
changes  (Table  6).  Individuals  were  first  classified  according  to  the  income  transition 
they  experienced  between  1984-85  and  1987-88.  We  then  calculated  median  net  worth, 
house  equity  as  a fraction  of net  worth  and  debt  as  a fraction  of  income  in  both  1984  and 
1989  for  each  subgroup  defined  by  income  change.15 
Table  6  here 
The  results  clearly  show  that  changes  in  net  worth  and  debt  closely  mirror  changes 
in  income.  Upwardly  mobile  individuals  climbing  into  either  the  high-  or  middle-income 
class  tended  to  enjoy  more  favorable  changes  in  wealth  than  did  those  with  downward 
income-based  transitions,  The  change  in net  worth  for  adults  who  persisted  in the  middle- Table 5.  Tends  in Income and Wealth Inequality 
1984-85  1987-88 
position in Income  Distribution  196768  Income  1977-78  Income  Income’  Net Wotthb  Income’  Net Wortbb 
20th Percentile  $17  819  $19  683  $20  399  $12  546  $21  871  $18  533 
Median  26  888  30  371  36  125  36  954  39  879  48  974 
9Ckh Percentile  46066  51  601  73  628  126 716  81  933  198  872 
Difference 9Oth-20th  28  247  31  918  53  229  114  170  60062  180  339 
Ratio 9Oth/2Oth  26  2.6  3.6  10.1  3.8  10.7 
%%  c!Fi222;  i!iETaEl.- 
st transfer family income in  196768  and 1977-78.  and pre-tax,  post-transfer income in  1984-85  and 1987-88,  inflated 
‘Net Worth is defined as the sum of the value of housin 
other debt.  Median vahres of net worth between the 1 
equi  real estate, vehicles, farm/business, stocks, savings/iivcstment,  and other assets. less 
&  and?&&  rcentrle 
percentile for the median, and 80th  and 100th percentile for the 
of income are given for the 20th percentile of income,  40th  and 60th 




1984  1989 
Mean  Ratio  of  Mean  Ratio  of 
Percent 
House  Debt/  Median  House  Debt/  Chan  ein  Change  in  Percent  of 
2-yr  Aver  e  Income  Class  in 
1984-8  and  1987-88  a% 
Mz?n 
NV%h  c  qW  2CroZg  WZh 
E  uityl 
qW  c  2CrGg 
P  Me  an  Median  Net 
worth  Net  orth  Net  Worth  worth 
Remained  High-Income  167.7  0.46  0.06  305.4  0.43  0.05  137.7  82  4.7  (139) 
Climbed  Into  High-Income  79.8  0.55  0.09  152.4  0.49  0.04  72.6  91  5.1  (148) 
Fell  From  High-Income  115.2  0.33*  0.05+  164.7  0.41*  O.lo+  49.5  43  1.7 (49) 
Remained  Middle-Income 
Eck  39.9  15.5  0.57  0.53  E%  54.3  26.1  0.56  0.54  %  14.4  10.6  ::  52.3  10.9  (1535)  (319) 
Nonblack  41.5  0.57  0:07  55.7  0.56  0:07  14.2  34  40.9  (1216) 
Remained  Low-Income 
&k  t::  0.17  0.14  0.05  0.03  0.5  3.1  0.25  0.27  :Z  -0.6  0.1  -16  p:  yj 
Nonblack  7:3  0.18  0.06  6.3  0.24  0:07  -1.0  -E  7.4  (233) 
Climbed  Out  of  Low-Income  7.6  0.19  0.10  18.1  0.37  0.08  10.5  138  7.4  (217) 
Fell  Into  Low-Income  22.6  0.41  0.07  12.6  0.43  0.08  -10.0  -44  5.6  (162) 
All  35.4  0.46  0.07  46.7  0.48  0.07  11.3  32  100  (2929) 
Note:  Data  cover  5-year  periods  and  compare  mean  re-tax  income  in  1984  and  1985  to  mean 
“low”  income  cutoff  is  $21,316.  Incomes  are  inflat eB 
to  1987  dollars  usin~the  cpI_uxl.  Net  F-tax,income  in  1987  and  1988.  The  “hip”  income  cytoff  is  $70,263.  The 
vehicles,  fdusiness,  stocks,  savings/mvestment.  and  other  assets,  less  o  et  debt 
orth  IS defined  as  the  sum  of  the  value  o  housmg  eqmty,  real  estate. 
to  net  worth  and  debt  to  2-yr  average  income  were  calculated  for  all  individuals  between  the  25th  and  75th  percentile  of  net  worth  in  each  group  except 
can  ratios  in  this  group  were  calculated  for  all  individuals. 21 
income  group  (+$14  400)  was  close  to  that  of  the  entire  sample  (+$ll  300,  the  row 
labelled  ‘All’  at  the  bottom  of  table). 
High-income  groups  experienced  large  increases  in net  worth  in both  absolute  and 
relative  tenns.  Moreover,  the  debt  burden  (relative  to  income)  of  those  remaining  in  or 
climbing  into  the  high-income  category  fell  slightly  as  did  their  ratio  of  housing  equity 
to  net  worth.  Hence,  the  wealth  gains  for  high-income,  prime-age  adults  were  largely  in 
fungible  nonhousing  wealth,  not  in  home  equity.  Debt  as  a fraction  of  income  remained 
constant  for  the  middle-income  group  but  grew  for  people  with  low  incomes.  People 
climbing  from  low-  to  middle-income  status  (labelled  ‘climbed  out  of  low’  in  the  table) 
did  relatively  well,  reducing  their  debt  burden  and  enjoying  the  largest  percentage  gain 
in  net  worth.  (However,  the  dollar  amount  associated  with  this  change  amounted  to  only 
$10  500.) 
Sample  sizes  of people  remaining  in  the  middle-  and  low-income  categories  were 
sufficiently  large  to  make  possible  separate  estimates  by  race.  Blacks  had  significantly 
lower  net  worth  in  both  periods.  Middle-income  blacks  enjoyed  larger  percentage  (but 
smaller  absolute)  gains  than  did  whites.  People  remaining  in  or  falling  into  the  low- 
income  group  did  the  worst,  posting  declines  in  net  worth  of  16  and  44  percent, 
respectively.  Among  the  low-income  group,  only  blacks  experienced  an  increase  in  net 
worth  --  and  then  it was  only  $100.  Median  net  worth  for  those  who  continued  to  have 
low  income  fell  by  $600  ($3700  to  $3100)  over  this  period.  In  contrast,  it  grew  by 
$137  700  ($167  700  to  $305  400)  for  individuals  remaining  in  the  high-income  group. _-  . 
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All  in  all,  the  addition  of  wealth  dramatically  reinforces  our  picture  of  increasing  income- 
based  inequality. 
VII.  Conclusions  and  Policy  Implications 
The  middle  of  the  income  distribution  among  prime  age  adults  in the  United  States 
has  indeed  withered  over  the  past  decade.  If  the  seven  percentage  point  decline  in prime- 
aged  adults  from  1978-79  to  1985-86  continued  until  1990,  the  middle-income  group 
would  constitute  less  than  65  percent  of  the  population.  We  find  that  cyclical  and 
demographic  factors  explain  little  of  the  accelerated  decline  in  the  number  of  middle- 
income  adults  in the  1980s;  all  avenues  of transition  out  of  the  middle-income  group  were 
more  heavily  travelled  during  the  past  decade. 
groups  was  marked  by  two  major  sets  of  forces: 
The  withering  of  middle-income  adult 
(1)  the  upward  movement  of  prune-age 
men  and  women  who  first  experienced  and  then  maintained  large  real  gains  in  their 
earnings  during  that  period,  and  (2)  the  stagnation  of  real  earnings  among  households  in 
the  low-income  category.  Wealth  change  in  the  latter  1980s  clearly  reinforced  income 
change,  particularly  among  individuals  remaining  in  the  high-income  group  and  among 
those  moving  from  middle-  to  high-income  status. 
Other  analyses  based  on  cross-sectional  data  and  microsimulation  models  (e.g., 
Michel,  1991;  U.S.  House  of  Representatives,  1991,  Appendices  I,  J,  K;  and  U.S. 
Congressional  Budget  Office,  1991),  confirm  that  the  trends  in our  data  continued  through 
the  late  1980s  and  are  projected  to  persist  into  the  early  1990s.  If  anything,  the  federal 
tax  reform  of  1986  solidified  the  gains  in  after-tax  income  reached  by  the  well-to-do _-  . 
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(Pechman,  1990),  while  the  analyses  in this  paper  indicate  that  the  recession  of  1990-1991 
should  reduce  upward  mobility  from  the  bottom  while  causing  many  of  those  most 
seriously  affected  to  fall  from  middle-class  status. 
It appears,  then,  that  the  1980s  and,  according  to some  prognosticators  (e.g.,  Reich, 
1991),  the  1990s  as  well,  will  constitute  an  epoch  in  American  life  that  was  quite 
different  from  the  from  post-war  decades  preceding  it.  Ours  is  a  time  marked  by  a 
significant  increase  in  real  income  and  wealth  for  those  with  already  high  incomes  and 
substantial  wealth.  Of  course,  this  change  alone  is  one  which  policymakers  should  be 
most  pleased  with--if  the  trend  was  for  upward  mobility  throughout  the  distribution,  But 
again,  large  sustained  income  gains  are  apparent  only  for  the  yachts--not  for  the  tugboats 
or  the  rowboats.  When  this  upward  mobility  among  the  few  is  coupled  with  the 
persistently  high  and  stagnant  poveq  rates  of  American  families  with  children  and  the 
growing  lack  of  upward  mobility  among  our  lower  but  still  working  class,  a  different 
policy  picture  emerges.  As  Federal  and  state  governments  struggle  to  find  funds  to  meet 
growing  needs  for  human  and  physical  capital,  for  health,  education  and  related  program 
areas  --  funds  to  extend  the  chance  for  upward  mobility  to  all  income  classes  --  we 
believe  that  we  have  found  a primary  tax  base  to meet  these  revenue  needs--the  growing 
affluence  of  high-income  middle-age  Americans. 
The  policy  discussions  underlying  the  1990  Deficit  Reduction  Act  increasingly 
brought  up  the  question  of  ‘fairness’  in the  distributional  effects  of public  tax  and  transfer 
policies  at the  Federal  government  level.  These  discussions  brought  policy  changes  which 
extended  modest  tax  relief  and  additional  health  care  benefits  to  low-income  families. --  l 
, 
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Because  this  coming  decade  will  continue  to  be  different  from  those  that  preceded  it,  we 
consider  it  vital  to  continue  to  re-examine  the  Federal  income  tax  and  to  reconsider 
wealth  taxation  -- in particular  capital  gains  taxation  of  wealth  at tune  of  death  or  transfer 
__ as  a  source  of  funding  to  meet  America’s  human  resource  needs.  Because  the  fruits 
of  American  economic  growth  are  increasingly  being  concentrated  among  the  privileged 
10  to  15  percent  of  the  population  at  the  top  of  the  middle-age  income  and  wealth 
distribution,  serious  consideration  should  be  given  to  modest  sharing  of  this  wealth,  such 
as  those  suggested  by  Downey  and  Gore  (1991)  and  by  the  National  Commission  on 
Children  (see  Steuerle  and  Jaffras,  1991)  and  their  proposals  to  substitute  a  refundable 
child  tax  credit  for  the  children’s  personal  exemption,  to  expand  basic  health  and  human 
capital  programs  to  cover  all  needy  youth,  and  above  all,  to  fund  these  expenditures  via 
a modest  increase  in  the  top  federal  income  tax  bracket  (from  34  to  37  percent).  The 
significant  secular  changes  in  the  size  distribution  of  permanent  income  found  in  this 
paper  make  a  strong  case  for  the  increased  taxation  of  high  income  Americans  as  an 
answer  to  the  oft  heard  question  in  Washington  and  in  the  state  capitals.....‘but  where  will 
we  raise  the  money?’ 25 
Appendix 
Measures  of  Economic  Status  and  Middle-Income  Boundaries 
Two  important  methodological  issues  arose  in  the  transition  analysis:  (1)  Should 
our  measure  of  household  income  adjust  for  differences  in  family  size?  and  (2)  What 
income  levels  should  define  the  boundaries  of  low-,  middle-  and  high-income  groups 
across  time? 
. 
Adjust  income  for  family  size? 
It  is  common  practice  in  poverty  research  to  adjust  income  for  family  size  to 
produce  an  income  measure  called  ‘income-to-needs’,  usually  obtained  by  dividing  a 
household’s  income  by  the  U.S.  Government  poverty  threshold  for  the  household’s  size. 
Well-being,  it is  argued,  depends  both  on  resources  (usually  income)  and  on  the  number 
and  characteristics  of  individuals  who  must  share  those  resources. 
But  what  happens  when  we  move  beyond  poverty  to  a study  of  middle-  and  high- 
income  status?  On  the  one  hand,  it can  be  argued  that  middle-income  status  also  depends 
on  both  income  and  how  that  income  is  shared  by  the  household.  A  household  with  two 
adults  and  an  annual  income  of  $35  000  has  more  income  per  person  than  does  a 
household  receiving  the  same  income  but  consisting  of  two  parents  and  two  children.  By 
this  logic,  a birth  reduces  well-being  if it is not  associated  with  an increase  in  income  and 
the  movement  of  a  child  from  this  house-hold  to  a  separate  dwelling  improves  the 
well-being  of  the  household  left  behind,  so  long  as  the  departing  child  has  ‘eaten’  more 
than  he  has  earned. 26 
However,  others  (e.g.,  Lambert,  1990;  Fisher,  1987;  Pollak  and  Wales,  1979)  have 
argued  that  at  some  point  in  the  income  distribution,  households  may  choose  to  add 
voluntarily  to  their  ‘needs’  via  the  birth  (or  adoption)  of  children.  In  such  cases,  where 
children  can  clearly  be  identified  as  what  economists  call  ‘consumption  goods,’  the 
addition  of  a child  does  not  necessarily  decrease  economic  well-being.  Particularly  in  a 
study  of  transitions  from  middle-  to  high-income,  such  adjustments  to  well-being  can 
become  arbitrary  and  misleading.  Since  we  feel  that  both  arguments  have  merit,  we  use 
two  kinds  of  income  boundaries:  adjusting  and  not  adjusting  for  family  size.  Size 
adjustments  are  accomplished  by  dividing  income  by  the  U.S.  poverty  line  and  its  implicit 
equivalence  scale. 
Defining  middle  (income)  class 
Our  search  for  upper  and  lower  boundaries  of  ‘middle  income’  began  with  a 
review  of how  several  authors  have  defined  the  rich,  affluent,  well-to-do,  upper  class,  etc., 
in  recent  studies  (Appendix  Table  1). Our  choice  of  the  boundary  of  ‘high  income-to- 
needs’  was  6.0  (i.e.,  six  times  the  poverty  line).  The  ‘high  income’  boundary  was  set  at 
$55  000  (in  1987  dollars).  These  cutoffs  came  from  examining  the  distribution  of 
two-year  average  income  and  income-to-needs,  expressed  in  1987  dollars  using  the  CPI- 
UXl,  and  the  sample  of  adults  (25-50)  defmed  earlier.  Income  trends  produce  changing 
numbers  of  adults  above  and  below  these  boundaries,  but  in  the  middle  of  the  sample 
period  (1977-1978)  each  of  these  measures  left  roughly  10 percent  (in  fact  9 percent)  of 
adults  with  high  incomes. 
Appendix  Table  A-l  here Table  A-l.  Definitions  of High-Income  Status  in Other  Studies 
Measure  of  “Richness”  Source 
150 to 200  percent  median;  above  200  percent  median 
top  one-thud  of  distribution  (affluent) 
Kosters  and  Ross  (1987) 
Rainwater  (1974) 
disposable  income  to needs  above  1.5 (well  to do) 
pre-tax  income  to needs  above  9.0  (rich) 
unad’usted  money  income  $75 000  to  $100  000 
(  d  mo  erately  affluent);  above  $100  000  (very  affluent) 
160 to 225  percent  median  (upper  middle  class);  over 
225  percent  median  (upper  class) 
Coder,  Smeeding,  Rainwater  (1989) 
Danziger,  Gottschalk,  Smolensky  (1989) 
U.S.  Bureau  of the  Census  (1998) 
Blackbum  and  Bloom  (1986,  1987) 
above  $50  000  in  1984 dollars  (high  income)  Bradbury  (1986) 
Horrigan  and Haugen  (1988);  Karoly  (1990)  variety  of  measures,  adjusted  and  unadjusted  es  ecially 
75th  and  90th  percentiles  of income  indexed  re alive  P 
to the  median 27 
Following  a  similar  procedure,  we  chose  the  2.0  income-to-needs  level  and 
$18  500  (in  1987  d  11  o  ars  as  boundaries  of  the  ‘low  income’  groups.  Each  of  these  ) 
separated  roughly  the  bottom  quintile  (actually  the  18th  percentile)  of  the  distributions  in 
1977-1978.  The  2.0  level  also  appeals  to  us  because  of  the  recent  work  of  Holden  and 
Smeeding  (1990)  and  Scholz  and  Maritato  (1990),  which  used  2.0  as  an  income-to-needs 
level  separating  the  economically  ‘insecure’  and  ‘secure’.  In  addition  we  felt  that 
cyclicity  of  income  and  earnings  movements  around  the  $20  000  threshold  (elg.,  Center 
on  Budget  and  Policy  Priorities,  1989;  Levy,  1987)  was  an  important  phenomenon  to 
capture  in our  analyses.  Thus  we  arrived  at our  distributions  of high-  (6.0  and  above;  $55 
000  and  above),  low-  (below  2.0;  below  $18  500),  and  middle-income  (2.00-5.99;  $18 
500  - $55  000)  groups. Table  A-2:  Logit  Regressions  for  Transitions  Into  High  Income  Gmup 
Years  in  sample: 
black  head  -0.1(5+  -0.92*  -0.78’  -0.64”  -0.70+  -0.59 
(0.15)  (0.19)  (0.23)  (0.24)  (0.32)  (0.37) 
female  head  0.46’  0.13  0.89’ 
(0.12)  (0.16)  (0.19) 
nverage  #  <  age  18  0.08’  0.  IO*  0.03  0.11’  0.12’  0.11 
yearSl&2  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.02)  (0.03)  (0.06) 
head  in  year  1 a  hjgh  0.23’  0.05 
(Z; 
0.16  0.01  0.80’ 
school  grad  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.13)  (0.14)  (0.36) 
head  in  year  1 has  at  0.95+  0.75’  I .72*  0.90+  0.t31*  1.44’ 
IMt  some  college  (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.20)  (0.12)  (0.13)  (0.34) 
head  in  year  1  C  -0.40’  -0.41*  -Q.43*  -O.51*  -0.49+  -0.57’ 
age  35  (0.05)  (0.06)  (0.08)  ’  (0.08)  (0.10)  (0.14) 
constant  -2.91+  -2.97’  -3.08’  -5.39’  -5.72+  -6.00’  -5.02’  -7.59’  -5.53+  -5.67’  4.69’  -14.69 
(0.03)  (0.05)  (0.05)  (0.17)  (0.18)  (0.20)  (0.21)  (0.46)  (0.39)  (0.40)  (0.40)  (28.62) 
For  all  persons.  all  years,  unweighted  0=45,942;  for  pm-1980,  n=32,032;  for  1980  and  after,  n =  13,9  10.  For  married  couples,  all  ytirs,  n =  15,460;  for  pre- 
1980,  n=  11,214;  for  1980  and  after,  n=4,246. 
+ indicates  absolute  value  of  (coefficient/standard  error)  >  2. . Table  A-4:  Logit  Regressions  for Transitions  Into  Low Income  Group 
Ycara in sample: 
For  dI  parsons,  all years,  unweightcd  n=34,211;  for  ~1~~1980, n=23,753;  for  1980 and after,  II= 10,458.  For  married  couples,  all years,  a=  13,607;  for pre- 
1980,  n=9,732;  for  1980 and  after,  x1=3,875. 
l indicntea  &solute  value  of  (coefficient/standard  error)  >  2. Table  A-5:  Logit  Regressions  for Transitions  Out of Low  Income  Group 
Persons  in sample: 
Years in  sample:  All  years 
kandard error)  Coefficient  (t 
-0.17+  -0.16”’  -0.09+  -0.21* 
(0-M)  (0.04)  (0.04)  (O-04) 
12.75+  14.10+  13.77+ 
(1.97)  (2.  IO)  (2.17) 
Independent  variable: 
middle  year  1980 
and  after 
lrmd  in par capitn 
4  dispOsabla 
income 
control8  for ratio  of 
average  family 
incomeyears1&2 
to  transition  line 
black  bead 
Y-  Y”  Yes 
-O.57*  -0.46+ 
(0.07)  (0.10) 
-0.48+  -0.33+ 
(0.06)  (0.08) 
0.21+  -0.04 
(0.01)  (0.03) 
0.51+  0.61” 
(O-06)  (0.09) 
no  Yes  Yes  Y= 
--+++g  fcmolc  bead 
-+--g 
average  I  <  age  18 
yuua1&2 
heodinyw  1 rhigh 
school  grad 




ww  (0.11) 
--I-- 
1.31*  1.07* 
(0.12)  (0.15) 
0.08  0.08 
(0.08)  (0. IO)  --l-- 
-2.20+  -2.12+ 




age  35 
For  all persons,  all years,  unweighkd  n = 14,361;  for  pre-1980,  n-10,002;  for  1980 and  after,  II-  -4,359.  For  married  couples,  all years,  n=2.907;  for pre- 
1980,  n=2,194;  for  1980 and  after,  n=713. 
+ kdicates  absolute  value  of  (coefficient/stand  error)  >  2. 
-2.63* 
(0.35) 
-2.51+  -2.41* 
I  I 
-1.45* 







As  explained  below,  as  of  late  1990,  a  consistent  time  series  on  post-tax 
household  income  is  possible  in  the  PSID  only  for  calendar  years  1967  through 
1986.  Incomes  for  1987  and  1988  are  used  only  in  the  wealth  section  of  the 
chapter. 
We  also  experimented  with  a transition  measure  that  required  household  income 
to be  in the  low-,  middle-  and  high-income  categories  for both  the  first  and  second 
or  both  fourth  and  fifth  years.  This  restriction  yielded  presumably  more  reliable 
but  fewer  transitions,  and  did  not  fundamentally  alter  the  conclusions  of  our 
analysis. 
An  alternative  approach  to  the  definition  of  boundaries,  suggested  by  Peter 
Gottschalk,  was  to  define  the  upper  and  lower  bounds  of  the  middle  class  at  the 
same  percentile  points  of  the  income  distribution  each  year.  We  implemented  this 
completely  relative  definition  by  setting  the  ‘high  income”  line  in  each  year  at the 
90th  percentile  and  the  lower  bound  of  the  middle  class  at  the  20th  percentile. 
With  one  minor  exception  (noted  below)  the  results  using  this  approach  were  very 
sirniliar  to  those  using  the  absolute  approach. 
As  documented  by  the  Center  on  Budget  and  Policy  Priorities  (1990),  the  1989 
CPS  data  show  an  all time  high  share  of  aggregate  income  for  the  top  quintile  and 
vertile  and  all  time  lows  for  the  bottom  two  quintiles.  The  middle  three-fifths  of 
the  family  income  distribution  in  1989  received  the  lowest  income  share  recorded 29 
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by  the  Census  since  1947,  only  50.8  percent  of  total  CPS  money  income,  while 
the  top  filth  of  families  shared  44.6  percent  of  the  total--their  largest  share  ever 
recorded. 
The  comparable  fractions  of  adults  making  the  four  transitions  involving  income- 
to-needs  are  7.7,  27.5,  31.8  and  6.8  percent,  respectively. 
In  calculating  trends  in  disposable  personal  income  per  capita  over  each  five-year 
period,  we  regressed  the  natural  logarithm  of  the  per  capita  personal  income 
measure  on  calendar  year.  The  slope  of  the  regression  line  has  the  interpretation 
as the  average  annual  percentage  growth.  This  produced  a set  of  “middle  years”  - 
- 1974,1975,1979,  1980  and  1981  -- with  economic  growth  that  was  much  below 
average. 
7.  Transitions  based  on  income-to-needs  showed  very  similar  calendar-year  patterns, 
as  did  transitions  based  on  the  completely  relative  definition  of  economic  status. 
The  single  exception  was  that  transitions  into  the  high-income  group  (top  9 
percent)  were  no  more  prevalent  in  the  1980s  than  before.  We  suspect  that  these 
differences  are  due  to  the  fact  that  the  top  9  percent  had  incomes  that  were 
growing  so  fast  that  they  succeeded  in  pulling  the  lower  boundary  of  the  top 
income  group  up  as fast  as the  incomes  of those  who  would  otherwise  have  joined 
the  group.  Hence,  the  extent  of  movement  “up”  the  distribution  was  no  greater 
in the  1980s  than  before.  A look  at the  inflation-adjusted  dollar  changes  in income 
among  adults  grouped  near  the  high-income  cutoff  point  (e.g.,  $50  000  - $55  000, l 
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$55  000  - $60  000,  etc.),  showed  all  of  the  medians  to  be  larger  in  the  1980s  than 
before. 
In  contrast  to the  other  transition  based  tables,  the  transitions  in Table  2 are based 
on  the  ‘both  year’  definition  of  income  that  required  family  income  to  be  in  a 
given  income  status  in  boty  years  1 and  2  or  4  and  5. 
9.  For  example,  in  the  analysis  of  transitions  from  middle-  into  high-income  status, 
a  person  with  an  initial  two  year  average  household  income  of  $27  500  would 
have  an  income  that  was  50 percent  of  the  $55  000  transition  line.  In  each  set  of 
regressions  we  expressed  the  distances  to  the  transition  lines  as  a set  of  dummy 
variables  based  on  quintiles  of  the  sample  at  risk  of  making  the  given  transition. 
10.  If  the  entire  income  distribution  were  moving  closer  to  the  upper  boundary  of  the 
middle-income  group,  then  the  typical  person  ‘at risk’  of  making  a transition  into 
the  upper-income  group  would  be  closer  to  the  boundary  after  1980  than  before. 
Our  dummy  variables  measuring  a person’s  distance  to  the  transition  boundary 
adjust  for  this  differential  risk. 
11.  We  calculated  the  effect  of  each  demographic  characteristic  by  estimating  a 
regression-adjusted  difference  between  the  given  demographic  group  and  overall 
sample  average.  We  then  converted  the  logistic  difference  into  an  adjusted 
probability  using  the  formula:  P,  =  P,  es&  /  [(l-P&  +  P,, eadX] where  P,  is  the 
adjusted  transition  probability,  Pb is the  overall  sample  probability,  p is the  logistic 
regression  coefficient  of  interest  and  Ax  is  the  change  in  the  independent  variable 
of  interest. 31 
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Recall  that  we  used  roughly  the  20th  and  90th  percentiles  of  the  income 
distribution  to  define  the  boundaries  of  our  middle-income  group. 
To  determine  pre-tax  income  cutoffs  for  the  1984-88  period  we  inflated  the 
$18  500  and  $55  000  amounts  to  1984-1988  levels  using  the  CPI-UXl  and  further 
increased  these  amounts  by  the  average  gap  between  pre-  and  post-tax  income  for 
households  in  1984  with  post-tax  income  around  $18  500  and  $55  000. 
14.  Another  way  to  integrate  wealth  into  our  income-based  analysis  of  inequality  is 
to  substitute  for  reported  property  income  (i.e.,  rent,  dividends  and  interest)  an 
imputed  return  on  net  wealth  and  to  recalculate  changes  in  the  size  of  the  low-, 
middle-  and  high-income  groups  based  on  this  expanded  definition  of  wealth.  We 
also  compared  income  transitions  based  on  the  two  alternative  treatments  of 
. 
income  from  wealth.  Virtually  never  were  favorable  transitions  based  on  one 
income  definition  accompanied  by  unfavorable  transitions  based  on  the  other 
definition. 
Using  pre-tax  income  levels  of  $70  263  and  $21  316  in  1987  dollars  as boundaries 
of  the  middle-income  group  we  applied  the  rate  of  return  on  U.S.  government 
long-term  bonds  to  net  worth  to  obtain  our  alternative  measure  of  income  from 
wealth.  With  these  boundaries,  the  group  of  middle-income  adults  shrank  in  size 
between  1984-85  and  1987-88  from  67.8  to  64.3  percent,  but  so  did  the  lower- 
income  group,  from  18.9  to  16.4  percent.  The  big  gainer  was  the  high-income 
group,  which  grew  from  13.2  to  19.1  percent. l 
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15.  In  calculating  house  equity  as  a  fraction  of  net  worth  and  debt  as  a  fraction  of 
income,  we  took  all  individuals  between  the  25th  and  75th  percentiles  and  then 
found  the  mean  of  these  ratios  across  these  sets  of  individuals.  Sample  sizes  for 
the  “fell  from  high  income”  group  were  sufficiently  small  that  we  took  all  such 
individuals  in  making  the  mean  ratio  calculations. _-  l 
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